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COMMENT 
THE IMPACT OF AUSTIN v. UNITED 
STATES: EXTENDING CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS TO CLAIMANTS IN CIVIL 
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS 
[T]he Bill of Rights which we guard so jealously 
and the procedures it guarantees are not to be ab-
rogated merely because a guilty man may escape 
prosecution or for any other expedient reason. 1 
In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or ra-
cial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this ba-
sic law and the values that [the Fourth Amend-
ment] represents may appear unrealistic or 
'extravagant' to some. But the values were those 
of the authors of our fundamental constitutional 
concepts.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Kevin and Bridget Perry live in a small mobile home in Os-
sipee, New Hampshire.s Their three children sleep in the single 
1. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 184 (1962) (holding § 401(j) of the 
Nationality Act of 1940, and § 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 un-
constitutional because they are essentially penal in character and inflict severe punish-
ment without due process of law and without the safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments}. . 
2. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (holding the warrantless 
search of an automobile parked in a driveway, incident to a lawful arrest which took 
place inside the home, unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
3. See Dennis Cauchon, Are Seizures 'Legalized Theft'?, USA TODAY, May 18, 1992, 
at AI. The article tells the story of the Perrys and of others whose lives have been turned 
upside down by civil forfeiture proceedings. The article also discusses abuse of civil for-
feiture laws by law enforcement agencies and officials, as well as some of the problems 
495 
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bedroom while Kevin and Bridget share a fold-out couch." In 
September of 1988 the Perrys were arrested for growing four 
marijuana plants behind their house. They eventually plead 
guilty to a charge of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. II The 
Perrys felt they had made a mistake. They also believed they 
had paid for that mistake. Unfortunately the United States gov-
ernment did not agree. One month later, the Perrys received a 
registered letter notifying them that the government was insti-
tuting civil forfeiture proceedings against their 27-year-old mo-
bile home. The government seized the Perry home for "facilitat-
ing" their crime, threatening the family with homelessness.8 
Richard Lyle Austin lives in a small mobile home in Gar-
reston, South Dakota. He also owns an auto body repair shop in 
the same town. In June of 1990, Austin pleaded guilty to, and 
was convicted of, one count of possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute.7 He was sentenced to seven years in prison.8 Ac-
cording to a police affidavit, Austin brought two grams of co-
caine from his home to his body shop to consummate a prear-
ranged sale. No money was ever exchanged.9 Shortly after his 
conviction, the United States government instituted civil forfei-
ture proceedings and seized Mr. Austin's home and business.1o 
For each story recounted here, there are countless others 
like them.l1 Concern that the value of seized property may be 
inherent in civil forfeiture proceedings. One example discussed is that once the govern-
ment has shown that it had reason to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture, 
the burden of proof shifts to the owner, who must show that his or her property was 
innocent. 
4. See id. 
5. See id. 
6. See id. 
7. United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 815 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom 
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (holding the Eighth Amendment's Exces-
sive Fines Clause not applicable to forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) 
and (a)(7) because they are in rem actions that are civil by statutory definition). 
8. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993). 
9. 508 Depot St., 964 F. 2d at 816. 
10. [d. 
11. See, e.g., Man Wants $250,000 For Seized Yacht, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 
May 19, 1992. The article reported that in 1990 David Stebbins' yacht the "Lazy Girl" 
was seized by federal agents. Stebbins was trying to sell the "Lazy Girl" but in the 
meantime was chartering the boat. Someone who chartered the boat used it as a meeting 
place to sell drugs to an undercover federal agent. Two years later Stebbins, an innocent 
owner, got the yacht back from the government with $85,000 in damage from improper 
storage. Stebbins had already been forced to pay the government $23,000 in fees for 
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grossly disproportionate to the crime committed or allegedly 
committed by the owner of the propertyl2 has prompted cries for 
reform from organizations like the National Association of Crim-
inal Defense Lawyers (NACDL).13 Concern about forfeiture 
abuse has also resulted in some unlikely political alliances. 14 
This c'omment will first provide a brief historic overview of 
civil forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines 
Clause. III The comment will then discuss how the guilty property 
fiction l6 and previous court interpretations of the Eighth 
Amendment have interacted to prevent proportionality review of 
civil forfeitures. Next, the comment will examine the Supreme 
Court decision in Austin v. United States l7 and its potential im-
pact on civil forfeiture law. Additionally, this comment will ex-
plore the potential of Austin to extend further constitutional 
protections to parties in civil forfeiture proceedings. Finally, this 
comment will conclude that, in light of the Austin decision, the 
guilty property fiction must be discarded. 
storage of the boat. 
12. Criticism of government abuse of civil forfeiture proceedings is not limited to 
issues of proportionality. See, e.g., Daryl Kelley, Ventura D.A. Says Fatal Raid Was 
Unjustified, Los ANGELES TIMES, March 30, 1993, at AI. In the fall of 1992, a Los Ange-
les County sheriff's deputy shot and killed millionaire Don Scott in his home during a 
drug raid. In March of 1993, Ventura County District Attorney Michael D. Bradbury 
issued a report on the raid concluding that there was no legal justification for the search 
warrant. No drugs of any kind were discovered in the raid which the D.A. characterized 
as "an example of the war on drugs gone awry." Bradbury also concluded, given that 
federal law allows drug enforcement agencies to retain the proceeds of drug forfeitures, 
the raid may have been prompted by a desire to seize Scott's $5 million ranch. [d. 
13. See Laura Duncan, Defense Bar Urges Congress to Reform Federal Asset For-
feiture Law, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, September 30, 1992, at 3. The article reports 
that the NACDL is urging Congress to reform federal forfeiture statutes which they 
claim have been widely abused. 
14. See Naftali Bendavid, Asset Forfeiture: Ripe for Reform, THE RECORDER, July 8, 
1993. The article reports that when Representative Henry Hyde, a conservative Republi-
can from Illinois known for his hard line approach to crime, held a press conference to 
announce his proposed asset forfeiture reform bill, he was joined by Nadine Strossen, 
president of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
16. See, e.g., United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 
(1971) ("Traditionally, forfeiture actions have proceeded upon the fiction that inanimate 
objects themselves can be guilty of wrongdoing.") This concept is hereinafter referred to 
as "the guilty property fiction." 
17. Austin v. United 'States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (holding civil forfeiture under 21 
U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) constitutes punishment and as such is subject to the 
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause). 
3
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II. OVERVIEW OF CIVIL FORFIETURE AND THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
A. THE GUILTY PROPERTY FICTION 
Historically, civil forfeiture has been characterized as a pro-
ceeding in rem.18 The basis for an in rem forfeiture action has 
been the legal fiction that the property committed and is 
charged with the wrong. Ie The historic characterization of civil 
forfeiture as a proceeding in rem enables the government to 
seize the personal20 and real property21 of private citizens with-
out the constitutional protections traditionally provided to per-
sons charged with wrongdoing.22 The Eighth Amendment's Ex-
cessive Fines Clause has been among the constitutional 
protections held not to apply in civil forfeiture proceedings.23 
Courts have thus been unwilling to conduct proportionality re-
view of seizures made pursuant to civil forfeiture statutes.24 
1. English Roots 
The evolution of the guilty property fiction is a long and 
confusing one. 2C1 Its Judeo-Christian roots have been traced by 
18. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971). 
19. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr. - Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921). The 
Court stated that civil forfeiture is a doctrine which "ascribe[sl to the property a certain 
personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong." 
20. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) (providing for the forfeiture of raw 
materials, products, equipment, containers, conveyances, books, records, moneys, negoti-
able instruments, securities, or other things of value which are used, or intended for use 
in facilitating the manufacture, transportation, concealment, sale, or possession any con-
trolled substance, in violation of the statute). 
21. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1993) (providing for the forfeiture of real property, ap-
purtenances, and improvements, used or intended for use to commit or facilitate the 
commission of a controlled substance violation punishable by more than one year in 
prison). 
22. See Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Ciuil Forfeiture 
Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911 (1990). Examples of 
constitutional protections traditionally provided to persons charged with wrongdoing in-
clude the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the prohibition against 
double jeopardy. [d. at 921-23. 
23. See, e.g., United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 
1289 (7th Cir. 1990). 
24. See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F. 2d 870, 881 (1990) (stating that 
proportionality review does not apply in civil forfeiture proceedings). 
25. See Piety, supra note 22, at 927, for an in depth discussion of the history of in 
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American courts and by legal scholars, to the biblical quotation 
"(i)f an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, [the ox] shall 
be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten. "26 This practice 
reflected the view that the instrument of death was guilty of a 
wrong which required atonement.27 The idea of religious expia-
tion was carried into the English Common law in the form of 
deodand.28 The word deodand is derived from the Latin Deo 
dandum, literally "to be given to God."29 
Under the law of deodand, the value of an instrument of 
death, be it animate or otherwise, was forfeited to the King.30 
The King was to use the value of the forfeited property to assure 
that masses were said for the "good of the dead man's soul."31 In 
its later incarnation any religious purpose was officially elimi-
nated and the deodand became a source of crown revenue.32 The 
deodand tradition was justified at this point in its history as a 
penalty for carelessness.33 Indeed, the abolition of the deodand 
in England in 1846 went hand in hand with the passage of Lord 
Campbell's Act, which created a cause of action for wrongful 
death.34 
England also recognized a form of common law forfeiture 
rem forfeiture. 
26. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.17 (1974) (cit-
ing Exodus 21:28-30). See also, O. HOLMES. THE COMMON LAW, 24-25 (Boston, Little, 
Brown, & Co. 1881); but see, Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Per-
spectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sover-
eignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973) (criticizing the reliance on this biblical quotation to 
support the guilty property fiction). 
27. See O. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 24-25 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881). 
28. See id. 
29. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n. 16. 
30. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300. Thus if a cart ran over a man and 
killed him, the cart owner was required to pay to the crown the value of that cart, so the 
cart might atone for its wrong. [d. . 
31. [d. Masses were required because the victim, having died a sudden death, was 
denied the opportunity to have the last rights administered. 
32. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681. 
33. BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *301 ("[Deodands were] grounded upon this ad-
ditional reason, that such misfortunes [wrongful deaths] are in part owing to the negli-
gence of the owner [of the property forfeited], and, therefore, he is properly punished by 
such forfeiture.") 
34. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681, n.19 ("Passage of the two bills was linked, be-
cause Lord Campbell was unwilling to eliminate the deodand institution, with its ten-
dency to deter carelessness, particularly by railroads, unless a right of action was granted 
to the dead man's survivors.") (citing 1 MATHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 419, 423-24 
(lst Am. ed. 1847». 
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known as forfeiture of estate. 311 Those convicted of a felony or of 
treason forfeited all of their real and personal property to the 
crown.36 Additionally, English law provided for statutory 
forfeiture of certain "offending objects" used in violation of cus-
tom and revenue laws such as the Navigation Acts of 1660.37 
2. Early American Forfeiture Law 
Neither deodand nor forfeiture of estate became part of the 
common law in the United States.3S However, the Supreme 
Court has observed that civil forfeiture is "likely a product of 
the confluence and merger of the deodand tradition and the be-
lief that the right to own property could be denied the 
wrongdoer. "39 
Before the adoption of the Constitution, the Colonies used 
in rem forfeiture proceedings to seize offending objects pursuant 
to both local and English statutes.40 Shortly after the Constitu-
tion was adopted, the new federal government enacted statutes 
that authorized the government to exercise in rem jurisdiction 
over ships and cargoes involved in customs offenses.41 These 
35. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *383-84. Blackstone traces the law of 
forfeiture of estate for the crime of treason not to feudal policy, but to the Scandinavian 
Constitution which was transmitted to the British Isles via their "Saxon ancestors." 
36. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *382. "The natural justice of forfeiture 
or confiscation of property for treason(s) is founded on this consideration: that he who 
hath thus violated the fundamental principles of government, and broken his part of the 
original contract between King and people, hath abandoned his connections with society, 
and hath no longer any right to those advantages which before belonged to him purely as 
a member of the community" of which the right to hold and to transfer property to 
others was considered of utmost importance. [d. 
37. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2807 (1993) (citing L. HARPER. THE 
ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS (1939». The Navigation Acts of 1660 required the shipping of 
most commodities in English vessels. Violation of the Acts resulted in forfeiture of both 
the illegal cargo and the vessel that carried it, and were construed so that the act of an 
individual seaman could result in the forfeiture of the entire ship. 
38. [d. at 2807. Forfeiture of estate for treason is proscribed by Article III Section 3 
of the United States Constitution, but the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned 
forfeiture of estate for the life of the traitor. See id. 
39. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974). 
40. See C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943). The bulk of the stat-
utes authorizing in rem forfeiture proceedings at the time of ratification were Customs 
and revenue laws. [d. at 145-48. 
41. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683. Subsequently, in rem forfeiture was ex-
panded to include vessels used to deliver slaves to foreign countries and, somewhat later, 
to this country. 
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statutes provided for proceedings in admiralty and were largely 
based on the English Navigation Acts."2 Prior to the introduc-
tion of statutory in rem forfeiture for narcotics offenses, 
admiralty was the primary arena for in rem forfeiture. 4S 
3. In Rem Forfeiture for Narcotics Offenses 
Between 1914 and 1970, Congress enacted more than 50 
pieces of legislation designed to control the use of drugs consid-
ered dangerous narcotics."" In 1970 Congress passed the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act."1i This stat-
ute was designed to collect and conform all previous laws under 
one piece of legislation, thereby eliminating confusion in en-
forcement of narcotics laws."6 The principle purpose of the Drug 
Control Act was "to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the 
growing menace of drug abuse in the United States."47 Congress' 
primary goals when enacting the statute were prevention, reha-
bilitation and increased effectiveness of law enforcement."8 
As part of the effort to increase law enforcement effective-
ness, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act provided for forfeiture of controlled substances, raw materi-
als and equipment used in their manufacture, conveyances used 
to transport or conceal controlled substances, books, records, 
and formulas used or intended for use in violation of the Act, 
and unlicensed plants from which controlled substances are de-
rived."9 In 1978 Congress amended the forfeiture provisions to 
include proceeds traceable to drug transactions, including money 
42. Piety, supra note 22, at 935. During this period in England admiralty courts did 
not have jurisdiction over persons. This is most likely why, in admiralty jurisdiction, in 
rem forfeiture is primarily seen as a procedural tool designed to allow the court to obtain 
control over vessels whose owners may be far away. 
43. In fact, 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1993) provides, "Any property subject to civil forfei-
ture to the United States under this subchapter may be seized by the Attorney General 
upon process issued pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and 
Maritime Claims by any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the 
property .... " 
44. H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4566, 4571. 
45. 21 U.S.C § 801-§ 969 (1988). 
46. H.R. Rep. No. 1444, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4571. 
47. Id. at 4567. 
48.Id. 
49. Id. at 4623-24. 
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and negotiable instruments. llo A senate report on this amend-
ment stated that forfeiture statutes were "penal in nature. "111 
In 1984, noting that "traditional criminal sanctions of fine 
and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enor-
mously profitable trade in dangerous drugs,"112 Congress again 
amended the civil forfeiture provisions of the Drug Control Act 
to include real property. liS Congress expressed a clear intent that 
the provisions for forfeiture of real property act as a "powerful 
deterrent" to the commission of drug offenses. 114 
B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted."1I1I Because bail, fines, and pun-
ishment have been associated primarily with the criminal pro-
cess,1I6 the Eighth Amendment was long understood to apply, 
perhaps exclusively, to criminal proceedings.1I7 
When determining the applicability of the Eighth Amend-
ment to a specific case, courts traditionally refer to the meaning 
of the Amendment at the time of ratification.1I8 The text of the 
Eighth Amendment was based on Article I, section 9 of the Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights, which in turn adopted verbatim the 
language of the English Bill of Rights.1I9 At the time of ratifica-
tion, the acknowledged purpose of the Eighth Amendment was 
50. H.R. Rep. No. 1193, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
9496,9522. 
51. [d. at 9522. 
52. H.R. Rep. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3374. 
53. [d. at 3398. 
54. [d. at 3378. 
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
56. Ingrahm v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). 
57. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989). 
58. [d. at 264 n. 4. 
59. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.lO (1983). See also, Browning-Ferris, 492 
U.S. at 266. The English version, adopted in 1689, states "excessive Bail ought not to be 
required, nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted." 
This statute was adopted after the accession of William and Mary, and was intended to 
curb the abuses of English judges under the reign on James II. See id. at 266-67. 
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to place limits on the power of the new government.so Addition-
ally, courts then understood the word "fine" to mean "a pay-
ment to a sovereign for some offense." SI Using strict historical 
interpretation, older Supreme Court cases declared that the 
Eighth Amendment was directed only at "those entrusted with 
the criminal law function of government."S2 
More recent Supreme Court decisions have held that when 
the scope rather than the applicability of the Eighth Amend-
ment is at issue, this strict historical approachss must give way 
to a broader standard.s4 To determine the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment, the courts must "draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society."sli Using this mode of inquiry, the Court concluded in 
Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,ss that "the his-
tory of the Eighth Amendment convinces us that the Excessive 
Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly im-
posed by, and payable to, the government."S7 This conclusion 
implied that the scope of the Eighth Amendment may encom-
pass civil cases in which the government actually or effectively 
imposes a fine payable directly to it.sS 
Lower court decisions have split on t.he question of whether 
the Eighth Amendment applies to in rem civil forfeiture 
60. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) ("[The] predominant po-
litical impulse [of proponents of the Bill of Rights] was distrust of power, and they in-
sisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse."); see also [ngrahm, 430 U.S. at 666 
(" At the time of its ratification, the original Constitution was criticized in the Massachu-
setts and Virginia Conventions for its failure to provide any protection for persons con-
victed of crimes. This criticism provided the impetus for inclusion of the Eighth Amend-
ment in the Bill of Rights."). 
61. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265. 
62. Ingrahm v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). The Court emphasized that the 
original draft of the English Bill of rights provided that "[t]he requiring of excessive bail 
of persons committed in criminal cases and imposing excessive fines, and illegal punish-
ments, to be prevented," stating that the deletion of the reference to criminal cases was 
"insignificant." [d. at 665. 
63. [d. at 670-71, n. 39 ("The applicability of the Eighth Amendment always has 
turned on its original meaning, as demonstrated by its historical derivation."). 
64. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 264 n. 4. 
65. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
66. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
67. [d. at 268. 
68. For example, in civil forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and 
(a)(7), the United States government is in effect imposing a fine which is directly payable 
to it. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993). 
9
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proceedings. Many courts hold that the Eighth Amendment does 
not apply to such proceedings because they do not constitute 
punishment for a crime.69 However, one court has held that 
some forfeitures may rise to the level of punishment, in which 
case the Eighth Amendment does apply.70 Austin v. United 
States71 settles this split. 
III. AUSTIN v. UNITED STATES 
A. FACTS 
On June 13, 1990, Keith Engebretson met Richard Lyle 
Austin at Austin's auto body repair shop.72 Engebretson agreed 
to purchase cocaine from Austin.73 Austin left the body shop and 
went to his mobile home. He returned to the body shop a short 
time later and sold Engebretson two grams of cocaine." 
Police searched Austin's business and residence pursuant to 
a duly executed search warrant.7Ii The search revealed small 
69. See, e.g., United States v.On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 
1289 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding the Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil in rem pro-
ceedings which are remedial in nature); accord, United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 
814 (8th Cir. 1992) (reluctantly agreeing that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply 
to civil in rem forfeiture proceedings). 
70. United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Dr., 954 F.2d 29 (2d. Cir. 1992). The court, 
reading United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) to apply to civil in rem forfeiture 
proceedings, held that the labels 'civil' and 'criminal' were not of paramount importance. 
See Id. at 35. The Halper court held that if a statute is "overwhelmingly disproportion-
ate" and "without rational relation" to the purported goal of compensating the govern-
ment, the statute is presumed punitive. Halper, 490 U.S. at 442. This is significant in the 
context of in rem forfeiture proceedings because they have often been justified as "liqui-
dated damages" for the governments expense in enforcing the law. See, e.g., One Lot of 
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S 232, 237 (1972) (holding forfeiture pro-
vides a reasonable form of liquidated damages and serves to reimburse the government 
for investigation and enforcement expenses). 
71. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993). 
72. See United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 815 (8th Cir. 1992) rev'd sub 
nom Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). All information about the facts of 
the case were taken from an affidavit submitted by Sioux Falls South Dakota police 
officer Donald Satterlee. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803. 
73. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d at 815. The opinion does not make clear Keith Engbret-
son's position with respect to either Mr. Austin, or the police department. It is possible 
that Engebretson was a confidential police informant; however, his actual status is 
unknown. 
74. Id. at 816. Mr. Austin denies that he received any money from Mr. Engebretson. 
75. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993). 
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amounts of cocaine and marijuana, a .22 caliber revolver, drug 
paraphernalia, and $4,700.00 in cash.76 Austin was arrested and 
subsequently indicted on four counts of violating South Dakota's 
drug laws. Austin pleaded guilty and was convicted of one count 
of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. He was sentenced 
to seven years imprisonment.77 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On September 7, 1990, .the United States government filed 
an in rem action seeking the forfeiture of Austin's home and 
business.78 Austin filed an answer to the complaint, objecting to 
the governments attempt to sieze his property.79 The United 
States government moved for summary judgment in the forfei-
ture proceeding.80 In opposition to summary judgment, Austin 
argued that forfeiture of his home and business violated the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.81 The district 
court rejected Austin's argument and entered summary 
76.Id. 
77. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803. 
78. See id. 
The forfeiture action was filed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4)and (a)(7) which 
provide as follows: 
(a) Subject property - the following shall be subject to forfei-
ture to the United States and no property right shall exist in 
them ... : (4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or 
vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, 
or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph 
(1), (2), or (9) ... : (7) All real property, including any right, 
title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the 
whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or 
improvements, 'which is used, or intended to be used, in any 
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission, a 
violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one 
year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be for-
feited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an 
owner, by reason of any act or omission established by the 
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowl-
edge or consent of that owner. 
79. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803. In sum, Austin contended that the gun found in 
his body shop was used to shoot sparrows and that he received no money from Engebret-
son on June 13, 1990. 
80. See United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F. 2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1992) reu'd sub 
nom Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). 
81. Id. at 817. 
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judgment for the United States.82 
Austin appealed, again contending that the forfeiture vio-
lated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.83 
The government argued that the Eighth Amendment was inap-
plicable because the forfeiture action was civil in nature.84 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reluc-
tantly agreed with the government and affirmed. 811 The United 
States Supreme Court granted Austin's petition for certiorari86 
to resolve an apparent conflict between the decision in United 
States v. 508 Depot Street,87 and the Second Circuit decision in 
United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive.88 
On July 28, 1993, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous deci-
sion,89 resolved this conflict, holding that the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment is applicable to in rem forfei-
ture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881.90 This decision cracked 
open a door many believed long closed,91 the door to affording 
greater constitutional protection to claimants in civil forfeiture 
82. 508 Depot Street, 964 F. 2d. at 816. 
83. Id. at 817. 
84. Id. The Court of Appeals was not convinced that the Eighth Amendment was 
restricted to criminal rather than civil proceedings. Instead it rested its decision on the 
guilty property fiction, noting that because this was an in rem action, the owner's culpa-
bility was apparently irrelevant. Despite its affirmance, the court observed that "it ap-
pears incongruous to require proportionality review for forfeitures when the government 
proceeds in personam, but not when the government proceeds in rem. . .. Legal niceties 
such as in rem and in personam mean little to individuals faced with losing important 
and/or valuable assets." Id. at 816. 
85. Id. at 817. "We say 'reluctantly' because we believe that the principle of propor-
tionality is a deeply rooted concept in the common law, and that as a modicum of fair-
ness, the principle of proportionality should be applied in civil actions that result in 
harsh penalties." Id. 
86. United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 
113 S. Ct. 1036 (1993) .. 
87. United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1992) rev'd sub nom 
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). 
88. United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992). 
89. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2802. Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in 
which White, Stevens, O'Conner and Souter, JJ. joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Renquist, C.J., and Thomas, J. joined. 
90. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812. 
91. See, e.g., United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 
1289 (7th Cir. 1990); see also One Lot of Emerald Cut Stones v. United States; 409 U.S 
232, 237 (1972). 
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proceedings.92 
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
1. The Parties' Contentions 
Austin contended that the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment applied to in rem civil forfeiture proceed-
ings.93 The United States government put forth two main argu-
ments. First, the Excessive Fines Clause does not govern civil 
proceedings unless they were recognized as criminal punishment 
at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified.94 Second, the 
Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil proceedings unless 
they are so punitive as to be considered criminal under the crite-
ria stated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez9 & and United 
States v. Ward. 96 
After an examination of the history of the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Court expressly rejected the government's contention 
92. In Austin, the Court declared that "forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and 
(a)(7) constitutes payment to a sovereign for the punishment of some offense." Austin, 
113 S. Ct. at 2812. 
93. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804. The Court noted that they had previously announced 
in Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989), that the Excessive 
Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to 
the government, but had found it unnecessary in that instance to determine whether the 
Clause applied only to criminal cases. [d. 
94. [d. 
95. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1962). The criteria announced in 
Mendoza-Martinez are the same as those traditionally applied to determine whether an 
Act of Congress is penal or regulatory in character: "[w)hether the sanction involves an 
affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence, whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which 
it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned." [d. at 168. 
96. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1979). "Our inquiry in this regard has 
traditionally proceeded on two levels. First, we have set out to determine whether Con-
gress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a 
preference for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention 
to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was 
so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." [d. at 248. In making 
the latter determination, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found it use-
ful to refer to the seven considerations listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. [d. at 
249. 
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that the Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal proceed- . 
ings.97 The Court declared that the Eighth Amendment's 
original purpose was to limit the government's power to pun-
ish.98 Accordingly, the correct inquiry is not whether the pro-
ceeding is criminal rather than civil, but whether the proceeding 
constitutes punishment.99 
2. Was Forfeiture Considered Punishment When The Eighth 
Amendment Was Ratified? 
The Court first considered whether forfeiture was perceived 
as punishment at the time of the Eighth Amendment's ratifica-
tion. loo The Court examined the history of in rem forfeiture,lol 
then discussed early United States law providing for in rem for-
feiture proceedings. l02 The Court noted that the First Congress 
intended forfeiture laws as punishment for the intentional or 
negligent acts of property owners. 103 
Next, the Court discussed its earlier cases that recognized 
97. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-05. In making this determination, the Court noted 
that unlike other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Eighth Amendment contains no 
language expressly limiting its application to criminal proceedings. The Court also con-
cluded that there is nothing in the history of the Amendment that would mandate such a 
reading. 
98. [d. at 2805. Interestingly, the Court cited the same language of the English Bill 
of Rights as was cited in Ingrahm v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), noting that the original 
draft contained a limitation to criminal proceedings but the final provision as adopted 
did not. The [ngrahm Court saw this as an indication of the intent to limit the Amend-
ment to criminal proceedings. The Austin Court found the opposite, stating essentially 
that had the Framers intended the Eighth Amendment to apply to criminal proceedings 
only, they certainly would have said so. Thus the Court reasoned that the absence of the 
criminal language compelled the conclusion that the Excessive Fines Clause may be ap-
plicable to civil proceedings. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805. 
99. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805-06. The Court noted that the notion of punishment as 
we commonly understand it cuts across the division between civil and criminal law. [d. at 
2805. 
100. [d. at 2806. 
101. [d. at 2806-07. The Court noted that the three types of forfeiture existing in 
England at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified were deodand, forfeiture of 
estate, and statutory forfeiture under the Navigation Acts. 
102. [d. at 2807-08. 
103. [d. In the Act of July 31, 1789 Congress provided that goods could not be un-
loaded from vessels except during the day and with a permit. If the commander of a ship 
was negligent in permitting goods to be unloaded in violation of the statute, he was pun-
ished with a fine of four hundred dollars per offense. These statutes listed forfeiture of 
goods and vessel alongside the other provisions for punishment. Additionally, the Court 
found it of some interest and import that 'forfeit' was the word Congress used for 'fine'. 
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either implicitly or explicitly that forfeiture was punishment. l04 
The Court noted that the same understanding of forfeiture ran 
through its decisions rejecting the "innocence of the owner" as a 
common law defense to forfeiture. 1011 Referring to two theories of 
forfeiture-that the property is guilty of the offense and that the 
owner may be held liable for the actions of those to whom he 
entrusts his property-Justice Blackmun stated that "[b]oth 
theories rest, at bottom, on the notion that the owner has been 
negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is 
properly punished for that negligence. "106 Thus, while the Court 
recognized that the guilty property fiction had "a venerable his-
tory in our case law,"107 the Court also stated that it "under-
stood this fiction to rest on the notion that the owner who allows 
his property to become involved in an offense has been 
negligent. "108 
In the most recent civil forfeiture cases, the Court had re-
served the question of whether the guilty property fiction could 
be used to forfeit the property of a truly innocent owner.109 In 
the Austin Court's view, there would be no reason to reserve 
that question if forfeiture did not punish the owner.110 "In sum, 
even though this Court had rejected the 'innocence' of the owner 
as a common-law defense to forfeiture, it consistently has recog-
nized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the 
owner."lll The Court concluded that in rem forfeiture has his-
torically been viewed as punishment. 112 
104. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808-10. Justice Blackmun cites Chief Justice Marshall's 
opinion in Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808), for the proposition that "the 
removal for which the act punishes the owner with a forfeiture of the goods must be 
made with his consent or connivance .... " 
105. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. at 2808. 
108. [d. at 2809. In J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 
(1921), the Court traced the roots of civil forfeiture to deodand, which Blackstone ex-
plained as a punishment for negligence. 
109. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2809. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 
U.S. 663,689-90 (1974), the Court noted that forfeiture of a truly innocent owner's prop-
erty would raise "serious constitutional questions." 
110. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2809. "Indeed it is only on the assumption that forfeiture 
serves in part to punish that the Court's past reservation of that question makes sense." 
111. [d. at 2810. 
112. [d. 
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3. Is Forfeiture Punishment Today? 
Next, the Court discussed whether forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881 is properly considered punishment today.1I3 The Court 
found nothing in either the statute1I4 or in the legislative history 
of the statutem to contradict the historical understanding of in 
rem forfeiture as punishment. The government argued that the 
applicable sections of the statute were remedial as opposed to 
punitive.1I6 Specifically, they argued: (1) the relevant statutory 
sections remove instruments of the drug trade, thereby protect-
ing the community,117 and (2) the forfeited assets compensate 
the government for expenses incurred in fighting "the war on 
drugs. "118 
The Court rejected these contentions.1I9 The Court rea-
soned that because owning a business or a mobile home is not a 
criminal act, the government's attempt to characterize these 
properties as "instruments" of the drug trade must fail. 120 Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that the dramatic variation in value 
of properties subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a)(4) 
113. [d. at 2810-12. 
114. [d. at 2810. Unlike traditional statutory forfeiture, 21 U.S.C. § 881 provides for 
an "innocent owner defense" which, in the Court's opinion, serves to focus the statute's 
provisions even more clearly on the culpability of the owner of the property. 
115. [d. at 2811. The Court noted that Congress has chosen to tie forfeiture directly 
to the commission of drug offenses. Furthermore, the Court considered the fact that 
when subsection (a)(7) was added to section 881 in 1984, Congress declared that "tradi-
tional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the 
enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs," and characterized in rem civil forfei-
ture as a "powerful deterrent." [d. (citing S. Rep. No. 225, 98 Cong., 1st Sess. 191 
(1983)). 
116. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811. 
117. ld. at 2811. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1) provides: "(a) The following shall be subject 
to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: (1) AU con-
trolled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in 
violation of this subchapter." Note that Austin does not challenge the Government's 
right to seize contraband. Because this provision removes dangerous items and instru-
mentalies from circulation it is remedial on its face. Austin's challenge is under 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7), which provide for government seizure of conveyances and real 
property, neither of which are inherently dangerous. 
118. [d. at 2811. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) provides that forfeited property or the proceeds 
from the sale of forfeited property may be transferred by the Attorney General to fed-
eral, state, or local law enforcement agencies, to compensate them for expenses incurred 
in prosecuting the forfeiture. 
119. [d. 
Although seizure of contraband may serve this purpose, seizure of otherwise lawful 
real property and conveyances does not. [d. at 2812. 
120. ld. at 2811. 
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and (a)(7) undercuts any argument that the value is rationally 
related to government expenses.121 "A civil sanction that cannot 
fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can 
only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent 
purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the 
term."122 The Court therefore held that forfeiture under 21 
U.S.C. § 881 constitutes payment to a sovereign as punishment 
for some offense, and as such is subject to the limitations of the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eight Aniendment.123 
IV. ANALYSIS OF AUSTIN v. UNITED STATES 
In Austin, the Supreme Court held that government seizure 
of real and personal property in an in rem forfeiture proceeding 
is punishment.124 In many ways, the Court's holding raises more 
questions than it answers. It is now evident that the Eighth 
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause compels proportionality 
review of forfeitures conducted pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).125 However, it is not clear at what point 
a forfeiture becomes disproportionate. Additionally, while forfei-
ture constitutes punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes, it 
is unclear whether courts will expand this holding to encompass 
challenges under the Fifth Amendment.126 Finally, courts must 
determine whether continued use of the guilty property fiction is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's view that forfeiture pun-
ishes the culpable behavior of individuals. This comment will 
121. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812. 
122. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 434, 448 
(1988)). 
123. Id. The Court declined to announce a formula for determining whether a forfei-
ture is excessive under the Eighth Amendment stating that "prudence dictates that we 
allow the lower courts to consider that question in the first instance." Id. 
124. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993). 
125. Id. 
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or pub-
lic danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
17
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explore each of these issues in turn. 
A. COURTS MUST TAKE A "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" 
ApPROACH TO ASSESSING PROPORTIONALITY 
Because civil forfeiture does not fall squarely within the 
civil or the criminal realm, it presents an interesting conundrum 
with respect to proportionality review. Although technically a 
civil remedy, forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) 
is punishment for an underlying criminal act.127 Furthermore, a 
claimant who is punished by a civil forfieture may, like Richard 
Austin, already have been punished criminally for the underly-
ing offense. Because 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) authorize 
the government's use of a civil remedy to punish a criminal act, 
courts should use both civil and criminal criteria to determine 
the proportionality of such forfeitures. 
In the criminal context, the Court has announced three cri-
teria courts should consider to determine whether a penalty is so 
disproportionate to the crime committed as to constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment:128 (1) the gravity of the offense and 
the harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other 
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed 
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.129 
In Alexander v. United States/ 30 the Court held that in 
personam forfeiture, also known as criminal forfeiture, is subject 
to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.131 The 
127. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7) (1988). 
128. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Note that proportionality review is essen-
tially the same under either the excessive fines clause or the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause. To be found cruel and unusual, a punishment must be "grossly dispropor-
tionate" to the crime committed. This standard encompasses the excessiveness standard 
so that if a punishment is cruel and unusual it must also be excessive. 
129. [d. at 292; but see Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), for a criticism 
of these criteria. In Harmelin, two Justices believed that the Eighth Amendment con-
tained no proportionality requirement and that Solem u. Helm should be overruled. 
They could not however, convince a majority that this was the case. The majority did 
agree that a sentence of life without parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine was 
not disproportionate. The question after Harmelin was whether any sentence short of 
death could be found disproportionate and thus cruel and unusual. 
130. Alexander v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2766 (1993) (remanding for a review of 
proportionality) . 
131. See id. at 2775-76. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss2/5
1994] AUSTIN v. UNITED STATES 513 
Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, sug-
gested that proportionality review should consider whether there 
was a sufficient connection between the property and the crimi-
nal activity to justify the forfeiture. 132 Justice Scalia, in his con-
curring opinion in Austin likewise suggested that "[t]he relevant 
inquiry for an excessive forfeiture under § 881 is the relation-
ship of the property to the offense: Was it close enough to 
render the property, under traditional standards, guilty and 
hence forfeitable?"133 
The Austin majority declined to put forth any specific ap-
proach to proportionality analysis, preferring to leave it to the 
lower courtS.134 Because the overwhelming majority of lower 
courts prior to the Austin decision held that the Eighth Amend-
ment was inapplicable to civil forfeiture proceedings, they sel-
dom reached the issue of proportionality.13~ As a result, lower 
court opinions provide little or no guidance on' approaches to 
proportionality review in the civil context. Lower court decisions 
expressing an opinion on proportionality appear to assume that 
as long as the forfeiture was authorized by the statute, it could 
never be found excessive.136 
By refusing to announce a standard by which proportional-
ity should be judged, the Supreme Court has extended no pro-
tection against excessive punishment to claimants in civil forfei-
ture actions. The landmark decision in Austin will thus have no 
impact unless lower courts take an active role. In view of the 
dual nature of civil forfeiture, courts would be well advised to 
take a "totality of the circumstances" approach and consider 
both the civil and the criminal criteria for proportionality. 
132. [d. at 2767. 
133. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815. 
134. [d. at 2812. 
135. See, e.g., United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Association Building, 
918 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1990); accord United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814 
(8th Cir. 1992). 
136. See, e.g., United States v. 566 Hendrickson Blvd., 986 F. 2d 990 (8th Cir. 1993). 
(upholding the seizure of claimant's home based on the presence of two marijuana plants 
and various greenhouse implements found in the attic). The majority stated that "as-
suming arguendo that the Eighth Amendment's protections do extend to the forfeiture 
of the claimant's home, the line at which forfeiture becomes disproportinate punishment 
or an excessive fine has not been crossed." [d. at 999. The court, using reasoning which 
seems circular at best, determined that the "line" was not crossed because the seizure 
was authorized by the statute. [d. 
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Courts should consider: (1) the gravity of the offense; (2) the 
relationship of the property to the underlying crime; and (3) the 
severity of any criminal sentence already imposed. The "guilt" 
of the property is not easily separated from the guilt of the 
property owner. By viewing the forfeiture in light of the totality 
of circumstances surrounding it, courts will be able to more ac-
curately determine whether a particular forfeiture is 
disproportionate. 
B. THE AUSTIN HOLDING SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO CHAL-
LENGES UNDER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE 
Arguably, the Court's holding in Austin could be construed 
narrowly so as to apply only when a proceeding is challenged 
under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. Justice 
Scalia argues that excessiveness inquiry is appropriate because 
in rem forfeiture is a fine, but would have come to this conclu-
sion without engaging in the "misleading discussion of culpabil-
ity."137 Ostensibly, such a construction would limit challenges to 
in rem forfeiture proceedings to excessiveness grounds, as there 
are no other express constitutional limitations on fines. 
The majority of the Court, however, did not expressly or im-
plicitly restrict its holding to cases challenged under the Eighth 
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. Instead, the Court stated 
that "forfeiture under [21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)] consti-
tutes 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense' 
and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amend-
ment's Excessive Fines Clause. "138 Logic dictates that if a pro-
ceeding is punitive, it remains punitive whether challenged as 
excessive under the Eighth Amendment or, for example, as a vi-
olation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Accordingly, courts should not limit the Austin holding to in-
stances where a civil forfeiture proceeding is challenged as 
excessive. 
137. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and 
Justice Thomas shared Justice Scalia's view that any discussion of culpability was inap-
propriate and unnecessary. [d. at 2815. 
138. [d. at 2812 (emphasis added). 
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C. EXTEND FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS TO CLAIMANTS IN 
CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS 
Civil law is concerned primarily with private rights and 
remedies. 139 Criminal law on the other hand is concerned with 
preventing harm to society!40 To achieve this goal, criminal law 
declares what conduct is prohibited, and prescribes the punish-
ment imposed for such conduct.141 Though these definitions are 
helpful in drawing broad distinctions, they are also mislead-
ing.142 In practice, the distinction between civil and criminal law 
is often blurred. Modern courts use civil remedies such as in rem 
forfeiture to achieve the goal of "punishing anti-social behav-
ior."143 Consequently there exists an expanding gray area in 
which civil and criminal law overlap.144 
In the late nineteenth century, the United States Supreme 
Court examined in rem forfeiture and determined that although 
labeled civil, such proceedings were criminal in nature.146 Over 
the next century, however, the Court retreated from this hold-
ing, following it in only two cases. U6 Even the Court's opinion in 
139. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (6th ed. 1990). 
140. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 374 (6th ed. 1990). 
141. See id. 
142. These definitions lead one to the conclusion that the boundaries between civil 
and criminal law are solid and airtight, when in actuality they are somewhat amorphous 
and malleable. See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Rem-
edies To Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Crim-
inal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991). 
143. Id. at 1325. 
144. Id. at 1325-27. Some examples of civil remedies used to achieve criminal law 
objectives cited by Professor Cheh are injunctions, forfeitures, restitution and civil fines. 
Professor Cheh also notes that many states are using civil law techniques to check do-
mestic violence, drug trafficking, weapons possession, and racial harassment. "[Ulsing 
civil remedies to redress criminal behavior is not new .... Yet the current phenomenon 
of civil remedies blending with criminal sanctions never has been more actively or con-
sciously pursued." Id. at 1327. 
145. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding that requiring a claimant 
in a civil forfeiture action to produce personal papers was a violation of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments). "We are also clearly of the opinion that proceedings instituted for 
the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses commit-
ted by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal .... " Id. at 
633-34. 
146. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (holding 
that the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings). "As Mr. Justice Brad-
ley aptly pointed out in Boyd, a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its 
object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against 
the law." [d. at 700. Accord United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 
21
Sackett: Austin v. United States
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
516 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:495 
Austin, which extended Eighth Amendment protection to claim-
ants in civil forfeiture proceedings, fell short of declaring that 
such proceedings are either criminal or "quasi-criminal." Thus 
the Austin decision widened the gray area between civil and 
criminal law as it pertains to forfeiture, perhaps to the point of 
irreconcilability. 
According to Austin, civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) constitutes payment to a sovereign as 
punishment for some offense. 147 The underlying "offenses" 
which justify forfeiture under these statutory sections, are crimi-
nal drug offenses. I48 It follows that forfeiture under this title, 
although labeled civil, is actually punishment for a criminal of-
fense. Furthermore, a critical look at the statute's intent and ef-
fect leads to the inevitable conclusion that the statute is at least 
quasi-criminal. Strict retention of the civil label would mean 
that courts continue to withold certain constitutional 
protections.149 
The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No per-
son shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law .... "1110 Courts should 
examine each of these Fifth Amendment provisions in light of 
715 (1971) (holding the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause and the resulting 
"right" to remain silent, are applicable in civil forfeiture proceedings despite the fact 
that production of papers is compelled under the forfeiture statute). Citing Boyd, the 
Court noted that "proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a 
man's property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in 
form, are in their nature criminal' for Fifth Amendment purposes." [d. at 718. 
147. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993). 
148. [d. at 2811. The Court noted, "Congress has chosen to tie forfeiture directly to 
the commission of drug offenses. Thus, under § 881(a)(4), a conveyance is forfeitable if it 
is used or intended for use to facilitate the transportation of controlled substances, their 
raw materials, or the equipment used to manufacture or distribute them. Under 
§ 881(a)(7), real property is forfeitable if it is used or intended for use to facilitate the 
commission of a drug-related crime punishable by more than one year's imprisonment." 
[d. 
149. The most notably absent protections include the right to be free from govern-
ment seizures absent due process of law, and prohibition against double jeopardy. U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. Other protections reserved specifically to criminal trials but not dis-
cussed in this article are the various Sixth Amendment protections. Additionally, be-
cause of the civil label in forfeiture proceedings, the claimant has no right to the pre-
sumption of innocence u~til proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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the decision in Austin v. United States. un 
1. Double Jeopardy 
The Supreme Court has held that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not· apply in civil forfeiture 
proceedings. 1II2 In Helvering v. Mitchell, the Court held that 
"Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in 
respect to the same act or omission; for the Double Jeopardy 
Clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second 
time to punish criminally for the same offense."1&3 Double Jeop-
ardy did not bar civil forfeiture actions because Congress could 
impose both a criminal and a civil sanction for the same under-
lying act. l &4 
In United States v. Halper, the Court backed away from 
the more restrictive view that the Double Jeopardy Clause ap-
plied only to criminal punishments. lll& The Court included 
"multiple punishments for the same offense" as one of the 
abuses Congress intended the Double Jeopardy Clause to pro-
tect against. 11l6 The Court also suggested that a civil sanction, 
although justified as remedial, could be so divorced from the 
government's damages and expenses as to constitute 
punishment.11l7 
Halper held that a civil penalty would be considered pun-
ishment if it "may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but 
only as a deterrent or retribution."1&8 The Austin Court broad-
ened Halper by emphasizing the Halper Court's statement that 
"a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a 
151. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). 
152. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) 
(holding that an individual is "in jeopardy" for Fifth Amendment purposes only when an 
action is essentially criminal); see also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 
409 U.S. 232 (1972). 
153. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938). 
154. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972). 
155. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (emphasis added). 
156. Id. at 440. 
157. See id. at 449-50. See also Lawrence A. Kasten, Extending Constitutional Pro-
tection to Civil Forfeitures That Exceed Rough Remedial Compensation, 60 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 194, 225 (1991). 
158. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). 
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remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serv-
ing either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment . . . 
. "1119 On this basis, the Court held that forfeiture under 
§§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is punishment.16o 
Because forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is punish-
ment, the Double Jeopardy clause should prohibit the govern-
ment from using forfeiture to punish a claimant who has already 
been punished criminally for the same underlying offense. Rich-
ard Lyle Austin, for example, was convicted of possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine and sentenced to seven years in 
prison. Because the subsequent civil forfeiture action against 
Austin's home and business constituted punishment for the 
same underlying offense, the forfeiture action should have been 
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
One solution to this constitutional dilemma is to hold a pre-
seizure forfeiture hearing at the same time as the criminal sen-
tencing.18l This approach allows courts to consider together all 
aspects of the claimant's punishment, including prison sentence 
and forfeiture. The "dual hearing" approach also preserves the 
government's ability to use forfeiture to punish illegal activity 
while providing greater protection to claimant/defendants. Fur-
thermore, Congress has recognized that "forfeiture of more sig-
nificant amounts of drug related property would likely be 
achieved if the judge and jury considering the criminal case were 
also permitted to determine the forfeiture issue .... "162 Fi-
nally, the government would still retain the authority to summa-
rily seize any contraband or otherwise inherently dangerous 
property.163 
159. [d. at 448 (emphasis added). 
160. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) ("In light of the historical 
understanding of forfeiture as punishment, the clear focus of §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) on 
the culpability of the owner, and the evidence that Congress understood those provisions 
as serving to deter and to punish, we cannot conclude that forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) 
and (a)(7) serves solely a remedial purpose."). 
161. On December 13, 1993, six months after Austin, the United States Supreme 
Court held that "in the absence of exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government in a civil forfeiture case from seizing real 
property without first affording the owner notice and an opportunity to be heard." 
United States v. Good, 114 S. Ct. 492, 497 (1993). 
162. H.R. Rep. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3393. 
163. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a)(l) provides for summary seizure of all controlled 
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Possibly the best solution is to eliminate civil forfeiture by 
merging its provisions with those of criminal forfeiture. The' 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Act,t64 in addition to 
containing provisions for civil forfeiture, also contains provisions 
for criminal forfeiture. 161! Under these provisions, the forfeiture 
must be alleged in the information and indictment.166 If the de-
fendant is found guilty, the court must return a special verdict 
as to the forfeiture allegations and must enter a judgment of for-
feiture against the defendant.167 Only then is the government 
authorized to seize the· property.16S Determining the extent of a 
claimant/defendant's punishment in a single proceeding would 
eliminate any Double Jeopardy concerns. Moreover, merging 
civil and criminal forfeiture would provide greater protection 
against government abuses by conferring on the claimant/de-
fendant all of the protections of a criminal proceeding.169 This 
would ensure that justice is served and would protect the gov-
ernment's ability to use forfeiture as a powerful weapon in the 
"war on drugs." 
2. Due Process-The Burden of Proof 
Generally, when seeking to impose some civil penalty, the 
government must demonstrate proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence. l7O Yet, when prosecuting a civil forfeiture action under 
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), the government need prove 
only that it had probable cause to believe that the property is 
subject to forfeiture. l7l Once the government has met this bur-
den, the burden of producing evidence and the burden of per-
suading the trier of fact shift to the claimant. In short, the prop-
erty owner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
substances. 
164. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969 (1988). 
165. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1993). 
166. H.R. Rep. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3376. 
167. [d. at 3376-77. 
168. [d. 
169. This would not only include the Fifth Amendment protections (supra note 152 
and accompanying text), but presumably Sixth Amendment protections as well. 
170. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 48 (1914). 
171. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) incorporates the requirements of seizure pursuant to U.S. 
customs law, which require only an initial showing of probable cause. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1615. See also United States v. Santoro, 866 F. 2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989). 
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his or her property is innocent of wrongdoing.172 
Ostensibly, the current allocation of the burden of proof in 
forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is 
constitutional.173 However, opinions upholding the constitution-
ality of the burden-shifting provisions of the statute have relied 
on characterization of the proceedings as civil. 174 Courts must 
reconsider the constitutionality of the statute's burden shifting 
provisions in light of Austin . 
. Austin implicitly recognizes that, although civil forfeiture 
proceedings are technically proceedings in rem, property owners 
must have acted in some culpable manner to come within the 
scope of the statute.17Ii The Aus.tin decision further acknowl-
edges that forfeiture of real property and conveyances under 21 
U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) constitutes punishment of the 
property owner for his or her cuplable acts.176 Additionally, the 
statute requires that the property owner's culpable behavior be 
criminal.177 Because the statute's burden shifting provisions only 
require the government to show probable cause, the statute en-
ables the government to punish individuals for criminal acts by 
depriving them of property interests, without proving that they 
committed the acts for which they are being punished. The cur-
rent allocation of the burden of proof thus substantially in-
creases the risk of erroneous deprivation of property.178 In the 
abstract this result is illogical. In application, it shocks the con-
science. Any process which encourages the government to punish 
172. See generally Peter Petrou, Due Process Implications of Shifting the Burden 
of Proof in Forfeiture Proceedings Arising Out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DUKE 
L.J. 822 (1984). 
173. United States v. Santoro, 866 F. 2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding the burden 
shifting aspect of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7) constitutional, because "Congress may alter the 
burden of proof in a civil proceeding as it sees fit."). See also United States v. $250,000 
in U.S. Currency, 808 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1987). 
174. See, e.g., $250,000 in U.S. Currency, 808 F.2d at 900. 
175. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806-12 (1993). 
176. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812. 
177. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), for example, provides that property is subject to forfei-
ture if it has been used or intended for use in a violation punishable by greater than one 
year imprisonment. 
178. Moreover, consider the probable outcome of a forfeiture proceeding in which 
the claimant chooses to excercise his or her privilege against self-incrimination. If the 
claimant does not speak, the claimant cannot win. Arguably, the allocation of the burden 
of proof thus also places an undue burden on the exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
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culpable behavior without first proving it is not due process of 
law. The burden of proof requirements in civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings must be changed. 
To comport with requirements of due process, the govern-
ment arguably should bear the burden of proving culpability by 
at least a preponderance of the evidence, as it must in other civil 
proceedings. However, requiring the government to meet only a 
preponderance standard may encourage the government to forgo 
criminal proceedings in favor of forfeiture proceedings because 
of the lesser burden of proof. 
Because forfeiture proceedings punish the alleged criminal 
acts of the claimant, the standard of proof should be akin to 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as required in criminal pro-
ceedings. Courts should eliminate the government's incentive to 
choose forfeiture over criminal charges by requiring the govern-
ment to meet a clear and convincing standard of proof. By elimi-
nating incentive for abuse, the clear and convincing standard 
provides the greatest protection to claimant/defendants. 
D. DISCARD THE GUILTY PROPERTY FICTION 
With its decision in Austin, the United States Supreme 
Court has explicitly recognized that in rem forfeiture punishes 
property owners for their culpable acts or omissions.179 It is diffi-
cult to reconcile the Austin holding with the continued use of 
the guilty property fiction. Austin makes clear that the culpabil-
ity of the property owner is the underlying concern of civil for-
feiture proceedings. ISO The culpability of the owner determines 
whether his property is forfeitable. lSI The forfeiture of the 
179. Furthermore, the Court in Austin stated that forfeiture has been justified both 
historically and in modern cases as punishment for negligent acts of the owner of the 
property. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806-10 (1993). 
180. If culpability of the property owner were irrelevant to in rem forfeiture pro-
ceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881, there would be no reason to make an exception for inno-
cent owners. Austin states, "In light of ... the clear focus of §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) on 
the culpability of the owner ... we cannot conclude that forfeiture under [this section) 
serves solely a remedial purpose." Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812. 
181. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) provide that property used in violation of 
title 21 is subject to forfeiture. The owner's use of his or her property, or the owner's 
negligence in allowing his or her property to be used in violation of the law is what 
renders the property subject to forfeiture. 
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property punishes the property owner. Thus the forfeiture pro-
ceeding is not against the property in any real or logical sense. 
The guilty property fiction now exists in name only. Continued 
use of the guilty property fictions impedes the court's ability to 
extend needed constitutional protections to claimants in civil 
forfeiture proceedings.182 For all of these reasons, the United 
States Supreme Court should officially and finally discard the 
guilty property fiction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Austin answered one com-
pelling question: whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment applies to in rem forfeiture proceedings. In 
rem forfeiture under the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act constitutes payment to a sovereign as punishment for some 
offense. Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, the offense underlying the for-
feiture must be a criminal drug offense. Because forfeiture under 
§ 881 thus constitutes punishment for a criminal offense, courts 
must extend Fifth Amendment protections to claimants in for-
feiture proceedings prosecuted under this title. These protec-
tions include the prohibition against double jeopardy, and the 
right to be deprived of property only after due process of law. 
Proportionality review under either the Excessive Fines Clause 
or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause must take into ac-
count the totality of the circumstances of the forfeiture. Consid-
ering the widespread abuse of in rem forfeiture, extending these 
constitutional protections is necessary to protect the citizenry of 
this nation, and to preserve the fundamental principles that are 
the foundation of our system of government. 
Robin M. Sackett183 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 141-51. 
183. Golden Gate Univ~rsity School of Law, class of 1995. The author wishes to 
extend her sincere thanks to Kevin Hunsaker, Professor Robert Calhoun, and Professor 
Barbara Anscher for their assistance and advice in the preparation of this comment. 
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